1. Introduction

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Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte ist eine Raumsonde auf der Rückseite des Mondes gelandet. Nach vier Wochen Flug setzte die chinesische Sonde Chang'e 4 am frühen Morgen auf dem Erdtrabanten auf. In Libyen und Nigeria steigt die Ölproduktion, der Ölpreis fällt. Trading CFDs and Forex may expose you to significant stc-comm.info OMV und der Öl-Dienstleister Schlumberger haben eine Absichtserklärung für eine strategische Zusammenarbeit unterzeichnet, wie der.

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Detected enhancement in functional properties was a result of partial hydrolysis of insoluble protein complexes. For a long time enzymatic hydrolysis has been recognized as relatively simple and a useful method for improving sensory and nutritive values of plant proteins. Limited enzymatic hydrolysis is also the safest way to obtain desirable functional properties such as gelling, foaming and emulsifying of plant based protein products Also, the latest research [ 1 — 3 ] has shown that proteases-treated plant proteins possessed good antioxidant activities.

Proteins of different plant sources such as soy [ 4 — 7 ], pea bean [ 1 , 2 , 8 , 9 ], rice [ 10 ], peanuts [ 11 , 12 ] cowpea [ 13 ] were the object of limited enzymatic hydrolysis. Different enzymes, including trypsin [ 14 , 15 ] papain [ 16 — 18 ], pepsin [ 4 , 19 , 20 ] and several commercial proteases with different activity [ 11 , 21 — 23 ], were used. It is well known that the effect of enzymatic hydrolysis is dependent on numerous factors such as type of enzyme [ 24 , 25 ] and treatment conditions enzyme-substrate ratio, reaction temperature, time of enzyme action, characteristics of substrate [ 21 ].

Thus, in order to achieve optimal results, hydrolysis must be carried out under strictly defined and controlled conditions. In contrast, intensively hydrolyzed plant proteins were characterized by poor functional properties, but good nutritive values.

Most research has focused on limited hydrolysis of soy protein products, while less attention was devoted to pea protein products. Research by Aluko et al. Dominant pea proteins are globulins, which are usually classified, according to the sedimentation coefficient, into two fractions, 7S and 11S. The dominant components of these fractions were legumin 11S protein , vicilin and convicilin 7S proteins. Properties of these proteins are well documented [ 30 — 34 ], so significant differences in amino acid composition, and structure and, consequently, different functionality of these proteins are already known [ 35 ].

Chymosin belongs to A1-family of protease and is characterized with broad specificity similar to that of pepsin A. It is primarily used for the enzymatic phase of coagulation of milk proteins. It is widely produced as recombined enzyme from genetically modified yeasts and has many commercial names, e. Due to low proteolytic activity and low cost, chymosin might be suitable to improve the functional properties of plant protein.

The possibility of its application in this sense is currently under debate. An exception is research of Sissons and Thurston [ 36 ], which examined the influence of chymosin on soy proteins. They showed that this enzyme had no significant proteolytic activity against native form of glycinin. In contrast, Stanojevic et al. In current literature, there is no data about the effect of particular enzymes on protein composition of pea isolates or on their functional properties.

Therefore, the aim of this study was to determine the applicability of chymosin as agents for improvement of solubility, emulsifying and foaming properties of pea protein isolates and to characterize changes of protein composition produced by enzymes.

A relatively inexpensive, high quality functional additive could be obtained by the action of this enzyme. Enzymatic hydrolysis curves of pea protein isolate PPI obtained with chymosin are presented in Figure 1. As could be expected, chymosin had low proteolytic activity against pea protein isolate. Depending on the time of proteolysis, DH values were 3. According to these values, modified isolates could be classified as low-modified products that should have better functional properties than the initial isolates.

Hydrolysis curves were quite similar to those produced by other enzymes. Namely, rapid hydrolysis was observed at the beginning of the reaction first 15 min.

Further treatment caused less intensive hydrolysis. Such behavior can be considered as a common characteristic of enzymatic reactions, and has been reported for several other commercial proteases acting on proteins from different legumes [ 21 , 24 ].

Results are presented in Figure 2. By methods applied in this work, proteins from non-modified isolates were separated into large numbers of fractions. Similar to other leguminoseas, under non-dissociative and non-reducing conditions, predominant pea proteins were showing a tendency toward re-association. Thus, bands at PAGE patterns of non-modified isolate represented their soluble complexes.

Fractions of high molecular mass and low mobility were dominant, as evidenced by PAGE-profiles. SDS-PAGE under reducing and non-reducing conditions separated total pea bean proteins into multiple components with molecular weight MW ranging from Legumin was identified with four bands of acidic MW Under reducing condition, three minor bands of monomeric non-reduced form of legumin MW Non-reducing conditions promoted the re-association of legumin subunits into monomeric form that was registered as intensive band with the same MW.

Also, the minor bands of The molecular weight of identified subunits and polypeptides calculated based on the Em value was consistent with the previous work of several authors [ 39 , 40 ]. Both types of profiles of modified isolates, native and SDS-, reflected low level of hydrolysis produced with chymosin and were qualitatively similar to profiles of non-modified isolate. This data was in agreement with the results of DH analysis, although some differences could be observed on both native and SDS profiles.

After 15 min of hydrolysis, bands with Em in the range of 0—0. Further hydrolysis 60 min induced almost complete breakdown of minor fractions in the Em range 0. With modified samples, high molecular weight fractions could be seen on the stacking gel as well as on the top of the resolving gel.

Such fractions were not registered on the stacking gel of non-modified isolates. Under reducing conditions in the presence of 2-mercaptoethanol these fractions almost completely disappeared. This indicated that most of these aggregates were formed through disulfide interactions. Pea proteins in general had low content of sulfur amino acids. The exception was legumin. Above infers that most of these aggregates probably resulted from interactions between partly degraded subunits of legumin.

Part of these products under non-reducing and especially under reducing conditions migrated as band with MW of 94 kDa and masked a less intensive band of lypoxigenase. Such results led to two conclusions. First, these proteins were stable against chymosin action, which was in agreement with the results of Sissons and Thurston [ 36 ] based on pure soy proteins.

Secondly, activity of enzyme was primarily directed to the degradation of non-soluble aggregates that were formed during the preparation of isolate. Due to degradation, significant changes of vicilin to legumin ratio, as well as sum of convicilin and vicilin to legumin ratio were registered.

According to results of densitometric analysis, such an increase was primarily a consequence of the lower concentration of legumin subunits. Solubility was measured at pH 3. Solubility of native, commercial and modified pea protein isolates is presented in Figure 3.

In general, chymosin improved solubility of PPI. Except at pH 7. For example, at pH 5. Also, at all pH, solubility of isolates was significantly higher compared to commercial isolate. Solubility of commercial, non-treated N. Means were of triplicate determinations. Especially good solubility of modified isolates was achieved in the range of low pH values 3—5.

Depending on the time of hydrolysis, at pH 3. Similarly, at pH 8. In contrast, at pH 7. These results were consistent with previous reports of Tsoukala et al. Nevertheless, even at this pH value the solubility of the modified isolate was better than the commercial isolate. Reduced solubility was probably a consequence of several factors, including: Increased hydrophobicity arises from exposure of interior hydrophobic residues after hydrolysis of globulins.

According to electrophoretic profiles, enzyme primarily acts on insoluble aggregates, thus freeing key proteins: These major proteins differ both on hydrophilicity and on values of dissociation constants. Vicilin is a lot more hydrophilic than legumin. However, legumin is more prone toward dissociation and re-association. Both dissociation and re-association are pH dependable. At pH 7, legumin exists in its less soluble hexameric form and the presence of such a hexamer leads to a decrease in solubility.

At basic pH, dissociation occurs at a slower rate. Since at acidic pH, monomers are the most abundant form of legumin, their pronounced solubility dictates overall higher values of that parameter. At pH 8, legumin is most probably present in mixture of different forms, from hexamers to monomers. So, at this pH, solubility shows a tendency to rise, because of partial denaturation of legumin hexamer.

EAI reflects the ability of the proteins to induce formation of the newly created dispersed particles in emulsions, whereas ESI value reflects their stability. Both parameters of non-modified isolates were pH-dependent with the minimum occurring near the isoelectric region at pH 5.

Also, dependence between both parameters and pH had similar U-shape profile, which was in agreement with previous investigations based on PPI [ 41 ], and other plant proteins [ 42 ]. Emulsifying activity of commercial, non-modified N. Emulsion stability of commercial, non-modified N.

As could be seen, emulsifying properties, especially emulsifying capacity could be improved by chymosin. In addition, the effect of this enzyme was influenced by both duration of hydrolysis and pH at which emulsions were prepared. Chymosin increased capacity of pea protein emulsions prepared at low pH 3. Similarly, improved EAI values were observed at pH 5. In contrast, at pH 8. However, partial hydrolysis with chymosin had variable effect on emulsion stability.

In general, with samples treated for 60 min emulsions were the most stable, but the maximum ESI value was detected with 30 min treated samples at pH 5. ESI of these samples at pH 7. According to results of this investigation, a moderate significant correlation 0. These correlations suggested that different factors affected these two parameters. Rise in emulsion capacity of modified isolates at pH 3. Due to better solubility, products of hydrolysis were reached easier at the interface than non-hydrolyzed proteins and formation of a protective layer was enhanced.

Lower capacity at pH 8. On the other hand, it is well known that stability of emulsion depends on the strength of protein-protein interaction at the oil-water interface. It seemed that proteins of 15 and 30 min modified isolates except 15 min treated samples at pH 3. The property of proteins to form and to stabilize foams is important in the production of a variety of foods.

Foams can be defined as a two-phase system consisting of air cells separated by a thin continuous liquid layer. As good foaming agents, proteins should form and stabilize foams rapidly and effectively at low concentration over the pH range which exists in various foods.

Obtained results are presented in Table 2. Chymosin improved foam capacity of PPI at all pH values. Slightly lower capacity by Foam capacity of other modified samples, depending on pH value, was in the range of Maximum was obtained with 30 min treated samples at pH 5.

According to our results, 15 min of chymosin action increased foam capacity at all pH values and depending on the pH, it was The most intensive rise was obtained at pH 5. Longer hydrolysis produced further increase at pH 5. Chymosin had no positive effect on foam stability at pH 7. Foams formed at these values were extremely unstable and completely disappeared within 3 min. In contrast, at lower pH values, especially with isolates treated for 60 min, foam stability was improved.

For example, stability of 60 min treated samples at pH 5. From these facts it could be deduced that various factors might have contributed to quicker foam formation combined with its stability in modified samples.

It is known that a rise in both diffusion speed of protein to interface and speed of denaturation on interface causes enhancement in ability of sample to form foams. These values, in turn, depend on the molecular mass, surface hydrophobicity, and the stability of the conformation. Lower FC values of modified isolates compared to PPI can generally, be regarded as a consequence of smaller molecular masses of hydrolysis products.

Difference in molecular masses of products of hydrolysis of major proteins might be explained by difference in their characteristics, such as: The stability of foam depends on the strength of the protein film and its permeability for gases. Pronounced instability of foams at higher pH values is probably due to the fact that, at this pH, both vicilin and convicilin are in their trimeric forms, while legumin is in the form of a hexamer.

The results obtained in this work suggested that chymosin can be a useful agent for improving emulsifying and foaming properties of pea proteins, especially at low pH values. In order to achieve better functionality of hydrolizates in a wide range of pH, it can be very useful to combine them with other components such as mono-and disaccharides.

According to Herceg et al. Since serum milk proteins and pea proteins differ significantly in their properties, the effect of added sugars on emulsifying and foaming properties of chymosin-modified pea isolates must be further investigated. Other steps include greater UN engagement with the east and addressing the question of securing petroleum facilities in future negotiations on the restructuring of the security sector.

The nearly month-long standoff over crude oil export terminals in eastern Libya is over. But another could soon emerge if the underlying causes of the conflict are not addressed. Otherwise, popular grievances will persist and renewed armed confrontation is possible. The oil terminals crisis unfolded in three stages. In late June, the struggle evolved into a larger feud over control of oil and gas revenues.

The result was an immediate shutdown of oil sales from eastern Libya: Haftar reversed course on 11 July, under intense international pressure and encouraged by several gestures by Tripoli. Haftar has also demanded such a review.

Neither a unity government nor new leadership at economic and financial institutions will be easy to achieve, given deep institutional divides, accumulated mistrust since and, most important, conflicting interests among Libyan actors jostling for positions in a new set-up.

The two sides have yet to agree on whether the review should include a financial audit, who should carry it out or with what precise objective. Such a review would be insufficient to resolve the economic crisis, root out endemic corruption or prevent a military escalation. To reach these goals, UNSMIL will need to increase its footprint in eastern Libya and act as a bridge between the Tripoli-based institutions and their rivals in the east, which will have to be engaged to end the institutional divides.

Additionally, it should help Libyan authorities flesh out a new consensual strategy on the composition and chain of command of forces deployed to secure hydrocarbon facilities to prevent competing claims of legitimacy from becoming a new trigger for war.

Any strategy aimed at stabilising the country must address all three components in an integrated manner. Competition for control of oil and gas export installations and revenues has emerged as a main driver of the conflict that has divided Libya since Six oil companies, either fully Libyan-owned state entities or joint ventures with international oil companies, own and manage the hundreds of interconnected oil wells here.

The joint ventures are: Waha Oil Company with U. Oil produced in the Sirte basin is exported through the four terminals of the oil crescent Sidra, Ras Lanuf, Marsa al-Brega and Zwetina and a fifth one, further east, in Tobruk Marsa al-Hariga. All are located in eastern Libya. Hide Footnote The past four years have seen at least six offensives by rival forces to seize this sparsely inhabited area, the latest in June Prior to the war, Libya produced 1. In , oil revenues accounted for almost 90 per cent of government income and remained the main source of foreign currency needed to pay for imported consumer goods, on which Libyans are heavily dependent in the absence of an industrial sector.

Mismanagement and corruption have conspired to further drain finances. Austerity measures, cash shortages including of foreign currency and poor political decision-making have led to a breakdown in public services.

Against this backdrop, rival political and military forces within Libya have sought to exploit popular anger at the intolerable status quo. The struggle for control of the oil crescent and its wealth stands at the heart of this confrontation. The UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement conferred international recognition upon a power-sharing body called the Presidency Council, headed by Faiez Serraj, which installed itself in Tripoli in early Hide Footnote According to the pact, the Presidency Council oversees the allocation of state funds deposited in the Central Bank.

Time for a Reset , 4 November The Presidency Council and the government over which it presides, the Government of National Accord, were supposed to bridge the political and military divides that split the country in when two rival administrations emerged after contested parliamentary elections: But the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, refused to recognise the agreement or the resulting government in Tripoli, instead continuing to confer legitimacy on a rival east-based government in al-Beyda with its own parallel Central Bank also located in al-Beyda and National Oil Company based in Benghazi.

Hide Footnote The political split also caused a rift in the security apparatus: Overcoming these multilayered divides is paramount if there is to be a lasting negotiated solution to the Libyan conflict. The crisis that crippled crude oil production and export in June-July reflects these political divides. The June attack on the oil crescent stemmed from rival claims of legitimacy by two parallel forces in charge of protecting the installations, each calling itself the Petroleum Facilities Guard.

This report examines what sparked this latest crisis, how it unfolded and what has happened to settle it, at least for now. It argues that unresolved underlying tensions, if not proactively managed, could ignite another crisis within months. On 14 June , a coalition of fighters under Ibrahim Jedran, a controversial former Petroleum Facilities Guard commander who controlled the oil crescent in , launched an offensive from a base near Bani Walid in western Libya.

His fighters proceeded overnight through a lightly populated stretch of coast east of Sirte to seize the strategic Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil export terminals and adjoining towns. When the LNA pushed Jedran out in September , he went abroad, then returned secretly to western Libya where he lived out of public view.

He was never officially stripped of his title of guard commander. Jedran claimed that his offensive aimed to restore his guard as the legitimate authority in the oil crescent and allow his followers from the Magharaba tribe one of the largest in the area to return to the homes they had fled two years prior.

Hide Footnote He may have employed this rhetoric to rally anti-Haftar factions in western Libya to his cause, but none came to his aid. In March , Jedran attempted to sell crude oil independently, but U. Crisis Group interviews, UN, U. The Tripoli NOC went so far as to declare force majeure a legal clause in oil sales that frees the seller of liability in circumstances beyond its control on crude oil loading at the Sidra and Ras Lanuf terminals, suspending exports.

Nonetheless, Jedran did have support from groups in the west other than his own loyalists and tribesmen.

Former members of the Benghazi Defence Brigades, a coalition of west-based anti-Haftar fighters driven from Benghazi by the LNA in that had allied with Jedran in previous failed attempts to recapture the oil crescent, joined him.

These Benghazi exiles are motivated primarily by the desire to weaken the LNA and return to their city. Hide Footnote Foreign mercenaries — allegedly Chadians — also took part in the attack, and Jedran may have received financial and material support from other anti-Haftar factions, including allies in Misrata and individuals with ties to Qadhafi-era officials.

Hide Footnote The High State Council in Tripoli, an advisory body established under the agreement that is a hotbed of anti-Haftar sentiment, did not condemn Jedran, seeing him as more legitimate than the LNA. Crisis Group phone interviews, Tripoli, Paris, June By 21 June, Haftar sent reinforcements, including critical air support, forcing Jedran and his fighters to retreat westward.

Overall, the initial attack and the subsequent counteroffensive caused at least 30 deaths, primarily among LNA fighters. It also destroyed two of the five operational crude oil storage tanks in Ras Lanuf and slightly damaged two others.

The Ras Lanuf crude oil storage tank farm has a total of thirteen tanks, but eight of these had already been destroyed in previous fighting between rival forces, as well as Islamic State ISIS attacks, in Hide Footnote Nevertheless, exports resumed immediately. The interim government based in the eastern town of al-Beyda and headed by Abdullah al-Thinni is not internationally recognised. Hide Footnote they also prevented vessels that had been contracted by the Tripoli NOC to load crude oil from docking.

From where do these armed groups get their money? From where do they get their weapons? We realised that the source [of these funds] is the oil we are protecting. We secure [the ports]; we are injured; we kill and are killed in order to allow vessels to depart and money to enter. But the money goes to militias and these militias attack us again.

The revelation that Jedran might have paid foreign mercenaries in U. Resentment about the perceived shortage of foreign currency is widespread in the east. An eastern political activist and commentator from Ajdabiya, pointing to photos circulating on social media showing Tripoli gangsters posing gleefully with millions of euros and U. The LNA has denied using foreign forces. It is difficult to establish the truth of allegations that western militias or politicians provided funding to Jedran.

Anti-Haftar activists claim the LNA fabricated them to justify its actions in the oil crescent. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli-based politician, Rome, July Hide Footnote This action meant that operations at all export terminals under LNA control, with the exception of Marsa al-Brega, came to a standstill.

Crisis Group phone interview, al-Brega, July Hide Footnote Total crude oil sales dropped from 1. After his forces took control of the oil crescent in , they worked with the Tripoli NOC; relations with its chairman, Mustafa Sanallah, were reportedly good. Hide Footnote Sanallah, a fierce Jedran critic, praised the LNA when it seized the oil crescent in and insisted on working with it despite the worries of Tripoli government officials about legitimising Haftar.

Since its creation in , the Libyan National Army has received no share of oil income — at least not officially — despite persistent requests to the NOC, which claimed it had no funds to disburse, and to the Tripoli-based Central Bank, which argued that budget decisions were the prerogative of the Tripoli-based government.

Given that Haftar does not recognise the Government of National Accord, it may be counterintuitive that he allowed oil revenues to accrue to Tripoli during this period. Hide Footnote Yet his position earned him much popular support. In a joint statement, the U. Joint statement on Libyan oil facilities , governments of U. It is possible that some of his advisers and government officials in the east led him to believe that the eastern NOC would be able to sell oil independently.

Pressure due to alleged accrued debts could have been another factor. But it is also possible that Haftar intended to use his move as a bargaining chip to secure greater influence in Tripoli-based institutions, especially the Central Bank. Hide Footnote they view him as a pawn of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they despise, and blame him for the mishandling of public funds that contributed to the economic crisis. ElKebir has denied supporting or depending on any political or religious faction, including the Brotherhood.

Libyan anti-Islamist media often portray the Tripoli-based Central Bank as serving Brotherhood interests. The eastern government and House of Representatives members, including its president, Aghela Saleh also backed the statement.

In , Jedran, with the support of eastern federalists a movement that advocates greater decentralisation for and, at times, secession of Cyrenaica , had gone as far as to announce the formation of a government of Cyrenaica.

That government never materialised. Some senior LNA commanders and eastern government officials in charge of public finances saw it as rash, given the financial hardship that a stoppage in oil sales would likely provoke. To date, the east-based bank continues to pay the ministers of the eastern government, members of the House of Representatives and LNA fighters recruited after Hide Footnote They also worried about possible backlash from attempting to sell oil independently, both at home, where it could be seen as an attempt at profiteering from shared national wealth much as Jedran was widely perceived to have done , and abroad.

Condemnation from Tripoli came quickly. Hide Footnote A Misratan faction that has engaged in back-channel conversations with the LNA for the past year and is critical of Serraj suggested that the oil crescent crisis could provide an opening for a political reconfiguration. A Misratan politician said: At the same time, the strong international condemnations of what Haftar did will likely force him to be a bit more modest in his aspirations.

Crisis Group phone interview, Misrata, 29 June The Benghazi NOC, which consists of just a handful of employees compared to the 65, employees of the recognised NOC and its subsidiaries , lacks the human resources to manage the entire oil industry and has a poor track record.

Employees at the export terminals, traders in the oil industry or member states have alerted the Tripoli-based NOC to planned illegal shipments. Crisis Group phone interview, UN official, July Hide Footnote More importantly, because it lacks international recognition, no international oil company or reputable commodity trader would be willing to deal with it. On 11 July, Haftar chose to backtrack, abruptly ending the standoff.

Several simultaneous factors, encouraged by discreet UN mediation efforts, contributed to his decision. Both sides have complained of a lack of transparency and clarity concerning financial transactions over the past four years, and both have made accusations of mismanagement.

Both Central Bank governors appear to agree on the need for a review of Central Bank spending in part because they both expect the findings to implicate their opponent , but they continue to differ on how this audit could take place; details need to be fleshed out.

Crisis Group interview, Tunis, 24 July The second factor was a public speech by Sanallah, the NOC chairman, in which he attempted to make amends with the LNA by praising it for its role in allowing oil production to increase between and Crisis Group interview, Western diplomats, Tunis, July Crisis Group phone interview, Benghazi, July International pressure spearheaded by the U.

It took the form of the threat of sanctions and an explicit message from the Trump administration requesting Libyan stakeholders to end their feud and resume production. Hide Footnote The U. Hide Footnote On 11 July, the internationally recognised NOC lifted the force majeure announcement for all eastern ports, and exports resumed. The end of the standoff and the reopening of the terminals came as a relief to financial authorities in Tripoli and reduced the risk of another attempt by groups in western Libya to take the oil crescent.

But a number of issues linger: Economic hardship is causing widespread anger, as are limits on access to foreign currency at the official exchange rate. A third is ongoing attempts by a number of groups in both eastern and western Libya, including Haftar supporters, to form a new government of national unity that they believe could end institutional divides.

Hide Footnote Libyans appear increasingly angered by the concentration of power in a few armed groups in Tripoli; in eastern Libya this grievance has become part of a narrative that blames Tripoli for squandering public funds and failing to carry out urgent reforms to stabilise the economy.

Majbari has lived most of his life in Benghazi. Hide Footnote On the other hand, the Central Bank based in al-Beyda also has been accused of a lack of transparency and embezzlement, and corruption is reportedly widespread in the east as well.

Hide Footnote Such accusations, often voiced in the west, tend to be overlooked in the east. Data provided by a Central Bank official, Tunis, July Hide Footnote Purchasing power has fallen, due to chronic cash shortages and high inflation, and public services have eroded. Discontent has built up over the realisation that a few prosper while most households struggle to make ends meet.

A tribal representative from the oil crescent said:. How can it be that international oil prices have risen, and oil production has gone up to over one million barrels per day, and yet we feel that we are poorer by the day? Food prices are higher than ever. In our tribe we used to have a cash fund to support our tribesmen in need, but now that fund has dried up because everybody is in need and nobody has money to contribute to the fund anymore.

It is the same with other tribes. On top of these considerations, there is also anger at the consolidation of a dysfunctional status quo — an important motive for residents of oil-rich eastern areas, in particular, who saw closing the terminals as a tool to force change at both political and economic levels. As an activist from the oil crescent put it:. We see no hope at the end of the road. We were told that there would be a new government, but that did not happen. We were promised unified institutions, but things are more divided than ever.

We thought there would be a new Central Bank governor who could resolve the problems, but he was not allowed to take office. A primary goal of various factions in both eastern and western Libya, both during the standoff and since, is the removal of ElKebir.

The Tobruk-based House of Representatives wants him replaced by Mohamed Shukri, whom it appointed as governor but who has been unable to assume his post while authorities in Tripoli dispute the appointment. House President Aghela Saleh argued that since the House does not recognise the agreement, it could appoint a new governor without consulting the Council.

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Dass es viele Bürger gibt, die keineswegs von Sozialneid geleitet sind und die z. The June attack on the oil crescent stemmed from rival claims of legitimacy by two parallel forces in charge of protecting the installations, each calling itself the Petroleum Facilities Guard.

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Hide Footnote A new legal battle began when politicians in Tripoli filed a legal case claiming that the House lacked a legal quorum when it appointed Shukri, thereby hoping to undermine the Tobruk-based House.

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